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rss-bridge 2026-02-11T10:00:59+00:00

Spam and phishing in 2025

The report contains statistics on spam and phishing in 2025, outlining the main trends: phishing and scam QR codes, ClickFix attacks, ChatGPT subscription lures and others.


Spam and phishing in 2025

11 Feb 2026

minute read

Table of Contents

  • The year in figures
  • Phishing and scams in 2025
  • Entertainment-themed phishing attacks and scams
  • Sensitive data at risk: phishing via government services
  • Know Your Customer
  • Messaging app phishing
  • Exploiting the ChatGPT hype
  • Job opportunities with a catch
  • Spam in 2025
  • Malicious attachments
  • Password-protected archives
  • E-signature service exploits
  • “Business correspondence” impersonating industrial companies
  • Attacks on hospitals
  • Messages containing instructions to run malicious scripts
  • Scams
  • Law enforcement impersonation scams in the Russian web segment
  • Fraudulent investment schemes
  • Fraudulent “brand partner” recruitment
  • Fraudulent overdue rent notices
  • QR codes in scam letters
  • News agenda
  • Methods of distributing email threats
  • Google services
  • OpenAI
  • Spear phishing and BEC attacks in 2025
  • QR codes
  • Link protection services
  • BEC and fabricated email chains
  • Statistics: phishing
  • Map of phishing attacks
  • Top-level domains
  • Organizations targeted by phishing attacks
  • Statistics: spam
  • Share of spam in email traffic
  • Countries and territories where spam originated
  • Malicious email attachments
  • Countries and territories targeted by malicious mailings
  • Conclusion

The year in figures

  • 44.99% of all emails sent worldwide and 43.27% of all emails sent in the Russian web segment were spam
  • 32.50% of all spam emails were sent from Russia
  • Kaspersky Mail Anti-Virus blocked 144,722,674 malicious email attachments
  • Our Anti-Phishing system thwarted 554,002,207 attempts to follow phishing links

Phishing and scams in 2025

Entertainment-themed phishing attacks and scams

In 2025, online streaming services remained a primary theme for phishing sites within the entertainment sector, typically by offering early access to major premieres ahead of their official release dates. Alongside these, there was a notable increase in phishing pages mimicking ticket aggregation platforms for live events. Cybercriminals lured users with offers of free tickets to see popular artists on pages that mirrored the branding of major ticket distributors. To participate in these “promotions”, victims were required to pay a nominal processing or ticket-shipping fee. Naturally, after paying the fee, the users never received any tickets.

In addition to concert-themed bait, other music-related scams gained significant traction. Users were directed to phishing pages and prompted to “vote for their favorite artist”, a common activity within fan communities. To bolster credibility, the scammers leveraged the branding of major companies like Google and Spotify. This specific scheme was designed to harvest credentials for multiple platforms simultaneously, as users were required to sign in with their Facebook, Instagram, or email credentials to participate.

As a pretext for harvesting Spotify credentials, attackers offered users a way to migrate their playlists to YouTube. To complete the transfer, victims were to just enter their Spotify credentials.

Beyond standard phishing, threat actors leveraged Spotify’s popularity for scams. In Brazil, scammers promoted a scheme where users were purportedly paid to listen to and rate songs.

To “withdraw” their earnings, users were required to provide their identification number for PIX, Brazil’s instant payment system.

Users were then prompted to verify their identity. To do so, the victim was required to make a small, one-time “verification payment”, an amount significantly lower than the potential earnings.

The form for submitting this “verification payment” was designed to appear highly authentic, even requesting various pieces of personal data. It is highly probable that this data was collected for use in subsequent attacks.

In another variation, users were invited to participate in a survey in exchange for a $1000 gift card. However, in a move typical of a scam, the victim was required to pay a small processing or shipping fee to claim the prize. Once the funds were transferred, the attackers vanished, and the website was taken offline.

Even deciding to go to an art venue with a girl from a dating site could result in financial loss. In this scenario, the “date” would suggest an in-person meeting after a brief period of rapport-building. They would propose a relatively inexpensive outing, such as a movie or a play at a niche theater. The scammer would go so far as to provide a link to a specific page where the victim could supposedly purchase tickets for the event.

To enhance the site’s perceived legitimacy, it even prompted the user to select their city of residence.

However, once the “ticket payment” was completed, both the booking site and the individual from the dating platform would vanish.

A similar tactic was employed by scam sites selling tickets for escape rooms. The design of these pages closely mirrored legitimate websites to lower the target’s guard.

Phishing pages masquerading as travel portals often capitalize on a sense of urgency, betting that a customer eager to book a “last-minute deal” will overlook an illegitimate URL. For example, the fraudulent page shown below offered exclusive tours of Japan, purportedly from a major Japanese tour operator.

Sensitive data at risk: phishing via government services

To harvest users’ personal data, attackers utilized a traditional phishing framework: fraudulent forms for document processing on sites posing as government portals. The visual design and content of these phishing pages meticulously replicated legitimate websites, offering the same services found on official sites. In Brazil, for instance, attackers collected personal data from individuals under the pretext of issuing a Rural Property Registration Certificate (CCIR).

Through this method, fraudsters tried to gain access to the victim’s highly sensitive information, including their individual taxpayer registry (CPF) number. This identifier serves as a unique key for every Brazilian national to access private accounts on government portals. It is also utilized in national databases and displayed on personal identification documents, making its interception particularly dangerous. Scammer access to this data poses a severe risk of identity theft, unauthorized access to government platforms, and financial exposure.

Furthermore, users were at risk of direct financial loss: in certain instances, the attackers requested a “processing fee” to facilitate the issuance of the important document.

Fraudsters also employed other methods to obtain CPF numbers. Specifically, we discovered phishing pages mimicking the official government service portal, which requires the CPF for sign-in.

Another theme exploited by scammers involved government payouts. In 2025, Singaporean citizens received government vouchers ranging from $600 to $800 in honor of the country’s 60th anniversary. To redeem these, users were required to sign in to the official program website. Fraudsters rushed to create web pages designed to mimic this site. Interestingly, the primary targets in this campaign were Telegram accounts, despite the fact that Telegram credentials were not a requirement for signing in to the legitimate portal.

We also identified a scam targeting users in Norway who were looking to renew or replace their driver’s licenses. Upon opening a website masquerading as the official Norwegian Public Roads Administration website, visitors were prompted to enter their vehicle registration and phone numbers.

Next, the victim was prompted for sensitive data, such as the personal identification number unique to every Norwegian citizen. By doing so, the attackers not only gained access to confidential information but also reinforced the illusion that the victim was interacting with an official website.

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